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Abstract
Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice, in which cartel members reduce
their output by the same percentage. We develop a simple method to quantify this
reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario. Our measure is
continuous, has a simple interpretation as the “degree of collusion” and nests the
earlier models in the existing literature. More importantly, by exploiting firms ex
post heterogeneity and optimality conditions, Corts (1999) critique can be addressed
by estimating time-varying degree of industry monopolization from a short panel of
firm-level observations. We illustrate the method in Monte-Carlo simulations and in
application to the data from the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel.
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Measuring market power and assessing industry conduct remain among the major chal-
lenges in empirical Industrial Organization. These questions have important implications
for welfare analysis and antitrust regulation. A wide variety of empirical models have
been developed to measure the degree of competition in markets where reliable cost
data are not available. The problem frequently boils down to estimating a “conduct
parameter,” which summarizes the level of competition in an industry. Typically, an
econometrician specifies a supply relation where the conduct parameter takes on distinct
values nesting Cournot, perfect competition (Bertrand), and perfect cartel (Monopoly)
models. Estimated parameter values are then interpreted as the degree of collusiveness. In
reality, however, the estimated parameter values are often significantly different from the
values describing either of the conduct regimes, making it harder to interpret.1 A problem
that is perhaps more serious than the internal inconsistency between a theoretical model
and its empirical implications is raised by Corts (1999), who shows that the estimated
parameter values may fail to measure market power due to dynamic considerations of the
firms. When firms are efficiently colluding, changes in the economic environment may
affect the degree of collusion (for example, cartel sustainability as described in Rotemberg
and Saloner, 1986), suggesting that the conduct parameter would change over time and
would be an endogenous variable. Thus, across-time variation in the demand and supply
conditions may fail to identify the industry conduct.
In this study, we propose an alternative way to evaluate the industry conduct, which
overcomes the aforementioned problems in the literature. The key to our method is an
assumption on the way collusion is implemented. Instead of assuming that the objective
function of a cartel is known, e.g., joint profit maximization, we assume that firms employ
Proportional Reduction (PR) collusive technology (as discussed in Schmalensee, 1987).
Under the Proportional Reduction assumption, cartel members reduce their outputs
proportionately relative to a benchmark market equilibrium output. We argue that
Proportional Reduction is both theoretically and empirically plausible. For example, it
1In such cases, the industry competitiveness is evaluated in terms of the number of firms playing a
particular equilibrium. This interpretation of the conjectural variation parameter is sometimes referenced
as the“as-if” interpretation. For example, an industry with N firms is as competitive as if it were Cournot
equilibrium with K players.
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is hard to see why symmetric players who maximize joint industry profit would reduce
their output non-proportionally.2 From an empirical point of view, although it is difficult
to show hard evidence that Cartel members are proportionately reducing their outputs,
Proportional Reduction is indirectly supported. This is because Proportional Reduction
can be seen as one particular type of market share allocation, which is frequently observed
in practice and recognized by judicial systems (courts), as documented in Marshall and
Marx (2008).3
Our method is simple and has several advantages over the traditional conduct pa-
rameter approach. First, our parameter takes values on a continuous interval, having a
simple interpretation as the percentage reduction in the output relative to a well-defined
benchmark competitive equilibrium outcome. Second, we show that firms’ heterogeneity
provides useful variation, which can be used to estimate time-varying degree of industry
monopolization from a relatively short panel of firm level observations. This source of
identification is present even when firms are symmetric ex ante, i.e., before realizations of
iid innovations to their costs. The ability to estimate a time-varying degree of collusion is
important to address Corts’ critique regarding endogenously chosen levels of monopoliza-
tion. Finally, while illustration of the method in this paper is provided using a very simple
static framework, the method is extendable to more complex settings with dynamically
optimizing agents and more flexible forms of the demand and cost functions. Therefore
while strong in itself, our assumption about collusive technology can help to accommodate
a wide variety of complex strategic interactions and can be used when a researcher prefers
to stay agnostic about the objective function of a cartel.
Our work is closely related to studies by Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982), and Porter
(1983). Ellison (1994) provides a comprehensive empirical comparison of competing
theories of collusion by Green and Porter (1984) versus Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). In
these (and many other) articles, in order to derive an empirical specification for estimation
a researcher has to assume that the objective function of a cartel is known, e.g., joint profit
maximization. In reality, the objective function of a cartel is rarely known. It may be quite
2Symmetry and joint profit maximization are standard assumptions in the literature, in which case
existing methods of identifying the parameter of interest (e.g., Bresnahan, 1982, Lau, 1982) are directly
applicable within our framework.
3Keeping their market shares constant, cartel members must reduce their output proportionately from
a benchmark equilibrium outcome.
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complex and depend not only on the current and future states of the demand and supply
conditions, but also on the probability of disclosure (which, in turn, may be a function of
the level of collusion itself) and expected punishment by the antitrust authorities. Given
feasible (potentially implementable in the real world) equilibrium supporting strategies
not all levels of collusion can be sustained, as described by Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986). Analysis of more complex settings, when the collusion occurs only along one of
the dimensions, e.g., price fixing with competition in quality or capacity, is provided in
Fershtman and Gandal (1994). Availability of reliable cost data facilitates estimation
of industry conduct considerably. For example, Genesove and Mullin (1998) conduct a
comprehensive comparison of various ways to estimate industry conduct and marginal
costs in the sugar industry. Wolfram (1999) also considers a model with time-varying
conduct parameters when direct measures of marginal costs are available. However, her
identification still relies on the time-series variation in the data because in a duopolistic
market the variation across firms is limited. A more structural way to address the Corts’
critique can be found in Puller (2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a general framework
and provides a simple example with a linear demand function and constant marginal cost
functions. We discuss extensions to the method using alternative demand and marginal
cost specifications and describe how the method can be used in estimation of dynamic
games. In Section 3 we discuss identification of our conduct parameter and evaluate its
finite-sample properties using Monte Carlo simulations. We illustrate an application of
our method using the well-known data of the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel
in 1880-1886 in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we outline our framework by presenting a simple model with linear demand
and constant marginal cost functions. Potential extensions of the model are discussed in
Section 2.3. We begin by describing alternative ways of implementing collusion.
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Schmalensee (1987) defines four distinct collusive technologies. The most profitable
one is full collusion with side payments, where only the most efficient firms produce. This
type of collusion is, perhaps, the least realistic for obvious reasons. The remaining three
ways of colluding do not require side payments.4 Market Sharing collusive technology
involve assigning production quotas. For example, the quotas may be chosen to equate the
critical discount factor among the cartel members, which would maximize sustainability
of the cartel. Such arrangements generally would require solving a non-trivial bargaining
problem, particularly when the firms are imperfectly informed about their rivals’ costs.
Collusion implemented through Market Division occurs when each firm is assigned to a
part of the market and charges its optimal monopoly price in this segment. The possibility
of arbitrage makes such a technology difficult to implement in practice. Finally, the last
type of reward distribution is Proportional Reduction, when firms fix their market shares
at some non-collusive (e.g. Cournot) values and each firm reduces the output by the same
proportion. Even though PR technology may generate lower profits than some (or even
all) of the alternatives, simplicity of its implementation may play a role. Another benefit
of the proportional reduction is that frequently used concentration measures (e.g. HHI
or Cn) would be observationally equivalent to a competitive outcome as the distribution
of market shares does not change between competitive and collusive regimes. The latter
is an important observation as it shows that PR technology is potentially empirically
testable. For example, when the degree of collusion changes, the distribution of market
shares stays the same, while aggregate output changes substantially.5
2.1 Basic setup
Consider a homogeneous product market with N firms competing in quantity over time,
t = 1, 2, . . . ,∞. Suppose each firm is characterized by a cost function denoted by Ci(qit, zit),
where qit is output and zit is a vector of cost shifters. Let the inverse demand function be
given by Pt = P (Qt, Yt), where Qt =
∑N
i=1 qit denotes total industry output and Yt is a
4Without side payments, collusion would imply positive production levels even for the least efficient
firms, making joint industry profit maximization infeasible.
5That being said, to construct an empirical test one would need to know exactly when the degree of
collusion has changed.
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vector of demand shifters. The per-period reward function is given by
πit = P (Qt, Yt)qit − Ci(qit, zit). (1)
The firms in the industry interact repeatedly and can be engaged in tacit collusion
agreements. Instead of making an assumption on the objective function of the cartel
which is typically unknown to econometricians, we make the following assumption on the
way the collusion is implemented.
Assumption 1: In any collusive period firms reduce their individual output proportionally
to the baseline Cournot quantities, i.e.,
qCit = θtq
PR
it , ∀i, t
where qCit and q
PR
it denote one period Cournot and collusive output levels under PR
respectively, and θt ≥ 1 is the inverse of the percentage reduction in output.
Assumption 1 implies that knowing θt allows us to compute the counterfactual Cournot
quantity by “inflating” observed output qPRit by a factor of θt. For example, suppose
that in the collusive period each firm reduces its output by 10% relative to the Cournot
quantity. Then, θt = 1
/
(1− 0.1) = 1.11. Under Assumption 1, the degree of collusion can
be summarized by the parameter θt. Hence, our ultimate objective is to estimate θt from
the observed data.
Before proceeding with how to recover θt, it is worth noting that we intentionally
abstain from developing a particular structural model of collusion, i.e., our model avoids
specifying the objective function of the cartel or the bargaining process, which we cannot
learn from the data. However, one can think of simple collusion supported by grim trigger
strategies with Cournot-Nash as the punishment phase. Lemma 1 in Appendix B shows
that proportional reduction technology is profitable for all firms in the neighborhood of the
Cournot equilibrium quantity. Therefore, it is straightforward to prove that there exists a
common discount factor β = min {β1, . . . , βN} , βi ∈ (0, 1) ∀i, such that the collusion is




Assume a linear inverse demand function Pt = α0 + α1Qt + α2Yt + ν
d
t and suppose in the
data we observe (qPRit , zit, P
PR
t , Yt), i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T . Under Assumption 1, the
following relationship must hold:
P (QCt , Yt) = P (Q
C
t , Yt)− P (QPRt , Yt) + P (QPRt , Yt)
= α1 (θt − 1)QPRt + P PRt ,
where QPR and P PR are collusive total output and equilibrium price, and P (QC , Y ) is an
unobserved (counterfactual) Cournot equilibrium price.
On the supply side, we assume a constant marginal cost function, i.e., ∂Ci(qit, zit)
/
∂qit =
β0i + zitβ + ν
s
it, where zit is a vector of observed cost shifters in the data and ν
s
it is un-






t − β0i − zitβ − νsit = 0. (2)






there would be incentives to deviate from the collusive quantity by expanding the output.
However, we know the relationship between the collusive and competitive regimes and,
therefore, can “restore” individual first-order conditions in terms of collusive values and
the parameter θt as follows
α1θtq
PR
it + α1 (θt − 1)QPRt + P PRt − β0i − zitβ − νsit = 0. (3)
Even though one may attempt to identify both θt and α1 using just the supply relation (3),
we focus on identification of the conduct and cost function parameters and assume,
throughout the rest of the paper, that α1 can be consistently estimated using conventional
instrumental variable techniques.6
From equation (3) one can already see that variation in qPRit across firms, holding
QPRt and P
PR
t fixed within a cross-section, provides additional identification power. More
6It is rather the degree of collusion that may change in response to changing economic environment.
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formally, identification of our parameter of interest relies on the availability of firm-level
exogenous cost shifters, which is summarized in the following Assumption 2.
Assumption 2: Data contains information on exogenous demand and firm-level cost
shifters, (Yt and z1t, . . . , zNt respectively), such that demand-side and cost-side innovations
satisfy







i zit and z−it are cost shifters for firms other than the firm i.
For example, if β0i = β0,∀i and we observe just one cost shifter satisfying Assumption 2
in the data, we can identify all parameters in the model given that T > 1.7 To see this,
rewrite equation (3) as
νsit = P
PR
t − β0 − zitβ − α1QPRt + θtα1(qPRit +QPRt ),
and define X = (1NT , z,q, IT ⊗ xt) and Z = (1NT , z, IT ⊗ z−it) where
• 1NT and 1T are vectors of ones of sizes N × T and T respectively;





1 , · · · , α1QPR1 , · · · , α1QPRT , · · · , α1QPRT
)′
;























• ⊗ denote Kronecker product.
The standard identification conditions for IV methods requires Z ′X to have a full column
rank. With just one period of data, it is clear that X does not have a full column rank,
due to the first and third columns. Hence, separate identification of the constant term
in the marginal cost specification and the time-varying parameter θt requires data for at
least two time periods.8
More generally, there are two sources of variation that help to identify the degree of
output reduction. The first one is variation across asymmetric firms. The second one
7The system would be over-identified if in addition we observe demand shifters.
8Of course, to estimate demand parameter α1 one would need longer time-series.
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is variation over time in the demand and supply conditions. Under the proportional
reduction, asymptotics is in terms of N × T ∗, where T ∗ is the number of time periods
with constant conduct parameter θt. Of course, to fully utilize this property a researcher
should specify observable cost shifters at the firm-level.
At this stage, it might be useful to compare our measure of market power to the
conduct parameter from the earlier literature (e.g., Bresnahan, 1982). Typically, the
existing literature identifies market power as a conduct parameter, λ, nesting three types





where λ can take 3 distinct values, depending on the underlying scenario of industry
conduct. Table 1 compares values of our parameter θ for each theoretically admissible
value of λ as a function of the number of firms, N .
[ *** Table 1 appears about here *** ]
The key difference is that our measure of market power, θ, is defined on a continuous
interval, while the game theoretic approach dictates only discrete values for λ, outside of
which interpretation of the parameter becomes vague. Of course, the number of firms puts
bounds on the values of θ that can be rationalized by a static model of profit maximization.9
Under ex ante symmetric firms such restrictions can be imposed to increase accuracy of the
estimates. However, with asymmetric firms and/or dynamically optimizing agents it may
be hard to make such sharp predictions. For example, in case of strong learning-by-doing
effects, in the early periods firms may rationally price below marginal costs. That being
said, dynamic optimization would require optimality conditions that are different from
equation (3), e.g., include proper derivatives of the continuation value. Such extensions
are beyond the scope of this paper.
9For example, with 9 symmetric competitors θ must be within [0.9, 1.8].
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2.3 Extensions
As we discussed in the previous section, in order to “restore” the individual first order
conditions in terms of (supposedly collusive) values of the observed variables one needs to
assume some functional form for the demand and cost functions.
Consider firm i’s maximization problem in a competitive regime where the per-period
profit function is given by equation (1). Assuming away any dynamic effects of the quantity
choice, e.g., there is neither the motive of “learning-by-doing” nor of investment into the
customer base in the case of state dependent demand schedules, first-order conditions for








When firms are in a collusive regime, under Assumption 1, equation (4) can be written in






















t , Yt) − P (QPRt , Yt)
]
represents a “collusive markup” over the Cournot
price level, i.e., the difference between the observed outcomes and hypothetical competitive
outcomes. This term measures price differences in the case of movement along the demand
curve from the observed output levels to competitive output levels.




= β0i + βqqit + zitβ + ν
d
it.
This case substantially complicates estimation of the conduct parameter in the earlier
literature (the problem description and potential solutions are discussed in Bresnahan,
1982, Lau, 1982). One of the frequently employed solutions would be to find exogenous
variables affecting elasticity of the demand, i.e., in addition to the demand shifters one
would need to find some demand “rotators”. Interestingly, when assumption 1 holds, we
can estimate parameters of the model without the demand rotators. To see this consider
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equation (3), which now becomes
(α1 − βq)θtqPRit + α1 (θt − 1)QPRt + P PRt − β0i − zitβ − εit = 0. (6)
As before, we assume that the slope of the demand function α1 is estimated using the
demand relationship (or that appropriate moment conditions are included into the GMM
criterion function). Therefore, we can identify θt from the coefficient on Q
PR
t , while βq
is identified by the coefficient on qPRit . Since identification of θt now relies on variation
in the aggregate output, it cannot be different for all t, i.e., one would need to assume
that the conduct parameter is constant for several time periods in the data.10 On the
other hand, presence of non-linear in qit terms in the cost function or non-linearity of the
demand function facilitates identification of the conduct parameter. These results are not
new and have been known since the early empirical literature on collusion. Therefore, we
don’t discuss them here.
One of the benefits of our method is that one does not have to assume that all firms
are colluding. The framework is easily applicable to an industry with a few dominant
players and a competitive fringe. As long as the researcher is willing to make assumptions
regarding the identities of colluding and free-riding firms, the method can be directly
applied (e.g., cheating firms would choose their output levels with θit = 1 if the baseline
NE is Cournot).
So far we have considered homogeneous product markets. Potentially, the method
can be applied to differentiated product markets with the assumption that output levels
(prices) are reduced (increased) by the same proportion. We do not consider this case
here. However, the topic is very interesting and is left for further research.
Another potential extension would be to use a more structural approach and to model
firms’ maximization problem as a dynamic game. For example, assumption 1 can be
used within the framework of Fershtman and Pakes (2000). However, this would require
explicit assumptions on the objective function of the colluding firms as well as specifying
punishment strategies, which is exactly what we want to avoid in this study. As long as
the baseline scenario (relative to which firms reduce their outputs) is given by a static
10Simulation results for a model with linear-in-qit cost function are available upon request.
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NE, it remains a NE of a dynamic game. Hence, our parameter estimates can still be
interpreted relative to a well-defined alternative conduct regime. An example of a more
structural approach, addressing the critique by Corts (1999) when the firms are engaged
in efficient collusion, is given in Puller (2009).
Finally, we briefly discuss testable implications of proportional reduction collusive
technology. If firms are colluding with θt = θ fixed within all periods in the observed
data, the distribution of market shares would be identical to the one under the baseline
scenario (Cournot in our case). However, if the regime of collusion changes at some point
in time (e.g., as a result of price war) one can search for such evidence by inspecting
variation in the aggregate or individual outputs and the distribution of market shares.
One possible example would be to check if a concentration measure (say, HHI or CN) is
statistically different in periods before and after the time of the potential change in the
conduct regime with a similar test (e.g., difference in means) used for the aggregate or
individual levels of output. If the test rejects that the distribution of market shares are
different while the difference in the output levels is significant, that would be consistent
with a change in the degree of collusion.
It is possible to show that exogenous changes in the demand and cost conditions in
case of asymmetric firms must take very specific forms to generate proportional reduction
in the individual output levels. In other words, it is very unlikely that in a Cournot
NE firms would respond to the exogenous variation in a proportional way. For example,






















By the implicit function theorem and Cournot first order conditions it is easy to show
that to replicate proportional reduction as a result of aggregate demand shocks one must
impose very strong restrictions on the underlying demand and cost functions. In particular,
it is not possible in the case of linear demand and constant marginal costs (unless the









where β(i) and β(j) are cost parameters for firms i and j. Similar conclusions can be made
regarding the cost shocks. While it might be possible to reverse-engineer a model (and/or
competitive equilibrium concept) where firms do respond to some exogenous variation
by replicating the proportional reduction collusive technology, we believe that for a very
wide class of parametric empirical specifications used for estimation this is not true.
3 Monte Carlo Simulations
In order to demonstrate performance of our method and evaluate the properties of our
estimator, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted. The details of the simulation design
are as follows. Inverse demand and marginal cost functions are given by
Pt = α0 + α1Qt + α2Yt + ν
d
t ,
mci(qit, zit) = β0 + β1zit + ν
s
it.
To make our simulations realistic, the following parameter values are chosen: demand
side parameters are given by α0 = 500, α1 = −1.0, and α2 = 1.0, and supply side
parameters are given by β0i = 10.0 ∀i and β1 = 1.0. The observable demand shifter, Yt,
the unobservable demand innovation, νdt , the observed cost shifter, zit, and the unobserved
cost shock νsit are randomly drawn from normal distributions, Yt
iid∼ N(0, 100), νdt
iid∼ N(0, 1),
zit
iid∼ N(1, 4) and νsit
iid∼ N(0, 0.04), respectively. In every period, firms operated in one of
three randomly chosen regimes with θt ∈ {1.0, 1.2, 1.4}, where θ = 1.0 implies Cournot
NE. To see the effects of the number of firms, N , and time periods, T , a set of pairs of
(N, T ) is chosen from {10, 20, 30} × {10, 20, 30}.
We simulate a data set 10,000 times and each time estimate parameters of the model
using 2-step optimal GMM. The GMM criterion function is constructed using two sets
of moment restrictions implied by Assumption 2. In particular, demand-side moment
conditions are constructed by interacting νdt with a constant, demand shifters and a sum
of firm-level cost shifters. Supply-side moment conditions are obtained using products
of νsit with (zit, z−it, Yt) and dummy variables for each regime. The weighting matrix is
assumed to have a block-diagonal structure.
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[ *** Table 2 appears about here *** ]
As our interest lies only in the estimates of the conduct parameter, Table 2 conveniently
summarizes average estimates of θt, denoted by θ̄, standard deviation and average values
of the estimated standard errors, denoted by Std. Dev. and ASE, respectively, for
(10, 30)× (10, 30) sample sizes. The full set of estimation results can be found in Appendix
C. In all cases, parameter estimates are precise and the standard deviations of the
estimated coefficients are consistent with the mean values of the standard errors. As
expected, the estimates become more accurate as the number of firms and/or the number
of time-series observations increases. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that a longer panel
(larger T ) improves precision of the parameter estimates slightly better than a wider
panel (larger N). We believe that this is because an increased number of time periods
contributes to both the demand- and supply-side moment conditions, whereas an increased
number of firms affects only the supply-side set of moment conditions.
4 Application: the Joint Executive Committee
In order to illustrate how our method works with real data, we apply our methodology to
the Joint Executive Committee (JEC) railroad cartel data from Porter (1983) and Ellison
(1994). The JEC was a legal cartel that controlled freight shipments from Chicago to
the Atlantic seaboard in the 1880’s. The cartel was created in 1879 – that is prior to the
Sherman Act of 1880. The data contains firm-level information on prices, shipment volumes
for grain and flour, and information about the availability of alternative transportation
routes through the Great Lakes. A detailed description of the data can be found in Porter
(1983) and Ellison (1994). It is worth noting that we provide this application primarily
for illustrative purposes and the estimation results could be improved, if more detailed
information were available, in particular on the individual firms’ cost shifters.
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4.1 Empirical Specification and Estimation
Let θ, α and β denote vectors of PR parameters, demand and cost function parameters
respectively, and assume that the members of the JEC use proportional reduction collusive
technology with parameter θt. Assume that the per-period profits of the firms within the





it; θ, α, β) = P (θtQt, Yt, ν
d
t ;α)θtqit − Ci(θtqit, zit, νsit; β),
where Qt =
∑Nt
i=1 qit, Nt is the number of firms in period t, Yt is a vector of observed




it) is a pair of demand
and supply-side shocks, respectively. We assume the following functional forms
P (Qt, Yt, ν
d





it; β) = Fi + (β0i + β1zit + ν
s
it) qit.
When reporting estimation results the case where β0i 6= β0j is referenced as “fixed effect”
(FE), and the restriction of β0i = β0, ∀i is denoted as “levels” (LE). In the data, we observe
shipment volumes for both grain and flour. Because of the potential (dis-)economies
of scope we define flour shipments to be an observable cost shifter zit when evaluating
collusion in the market for grain.11
Under our assumption of PR collusive technology, static Cournot first order conditions
are given by (3). In order to estimate parameters of the model we estimate the demand
and supply relations jointly. In particular, for any given vector of parameters, we isolate
demand and supply shocks using the following system of equations,
 ν
d
t = Pt − α0 − α1Qt − α2Yt,
νsit = β0i + β1zit − (α1θtqPRit + α1 (θt − 1)QPRt + P PRt ).
Our estimation is based on the orthogonality restrictions following from the conditional
11We admit potential caveats related to the assumption of exogenous flour shipment volumes, however,
available data do not provide us with better instrumental variables.
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independence assumptions,
E[νdt |Yt, Zt] = E[νsit|Yt, zit, z−it] = 0,
where Zt =
∑Nt
i=1 zit, z−it =
∑
j 6=i zjt. In practice, we interact z−it with a set of dummy
variables, one for each of the collusive regimes. We construct sample analogs of the
population moment conditions, GNd (Yt, Zt;α) and G
N
s (Yt, zit, z−it;α, β, θ)
GN(Yt, Zt, zit, z−it;α, β, θ) =
 GNd (Yt, Zt;α)
GNs (Yt, zit, z−it;α, β, θ)
 ,
and estimate parameters using the following GMM criterion function
(α∗, β∗, θ∗) = arg min
(α,β,θ)
{
GN (Yt, Zt, zit, z−it;α, β, θ)
′ ·W ·GN (Yt, Zt, zit, z−it;α, β, θ)
}
,
with a block-diagonal weighting matrix W .12
4.2 Estimation Results
4.2.1 Overall Results
As our main focus is again on the degree of collusion, Table 3 lists the inverse of the
estimated degree of collusion (1/θ̂) in the FE specification. The full set of estimation
results are documented in Appendix A. Parameter estimates obtained from the LE
specification are similar and can be also found in Tables 6, 8, 10, and 12 in Appendix A.
[ *** Table 3 appears about here *** ]
Model (i) assumes that θ is constant for the entire sample period, regardless of the
number of firms or other observables (see the results in the first column in Table 3). The
detailed estimation results for this specification are documented in Table 7. According to
12In the first stage, the weighting matrix is obtained as inner product of the instrumental variables
matrices, which would be optimal for linear model. In the second (and consecutive) stage(s), we compute
optimal weighting matrix using empirical variance of the moment conditions.
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the results, on average firms produced 31% more output than they would produce under
the Cournot scenario.13 Similarly, Model (ii) (in the second and third columns) assumes
that the cartel is maintained at the same level of θ1 during all collusive periods and that
the firms produce (1/θ0-1)% more in competitive periods than they would do in Cournot.
The estimates imply that, in the collusive period, the output was reduced to about 71%
of hypothetical Cournot quantity. During price wars, on the other hand, firms produced
51% more than they would do in Cournot.
Estimation results become more plausible when the conduct regimes are defined as
unique combinations of the number of firms and the indicator of collusion, because it is
possible that these firms would target a different level of reductions, depending on the
number of member firms. The results from Model (iii) under the fourth and fifth columns
in Table 7 indicate that whenever the cartel indicator is equal to one, these firms produced
40 to 81% of the Cournot quantity. In the meantime, when the cartel broke down and
the firms were involved in price wars, firms produce more than they would do in the
Cournot equilibrium, except for the case of 7 firms. Interestingly, the estimated degree of
monopolization monotonically declines in the number of firms, which is consistent with
the presumption that larger cartels are less sustainable.
It is natural to believe that the firms collude on different levels depending on the
existence of a competitor to the cartel, the Great Lakes, and thus we further use finer
categorization in Model (iv). This specification assumes that the degree of monopolization
depends on the number of firms, collusive indicator and the state of demand, i.e., whether
the Great Lakes were open for navigation. The estimation results for this case are
summarized in the last four columns of Table 3. Our estimates suggest that the degree
of monopolization declines in the number of firms and is generally lower at lower states
of demand. The latter speaks against the counter-cyclical cartel pricing patterns as in
the model by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). According to their predictions, a cartel
would reduce the degree of monopolization at high states of demand to reduce incentives
for cheating. Instead, we find that when facing competition from the Great Lakes
transportation routes JEC members reduce their level of collusion.14
13Interestingly, this result is consistent with the findings in Porter (1983) where for constant θ the
firms’ behavior in collusive periods was roughly consistent with Cournot equilibrium (pp. 309-310).
14Again, this finding is similar to the one in Ellison (1994), where no evidence of the countercyclical
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Since estimated parameter values imply a relatively high degree of collusion compared
to a hypothetical Cournot equilibrium, we conducted the following experiment. Given our
estimates of the cost function parameters, we calculated optimal monopoly and perfectly
competitive quantity levels for each firm. The smallest optimal monopoly output among
the colluding firms defines a lower bound on the total quantity of the cartel, while the
largest (Bertrand) competitive quantity among the participating firms would impose an
upper bound consistent with rational behavior. Figure 1 summarizes the results for the
firm fixed-effect specification. Figure 3 in Appendix A presents same statistics for the
specification in levels. As is apparent from the top panel of the figure, in most cases
observed quantities stay in-between the upper and lower bounds. In particular, for the
FE specification in 202 out of 328 weeks (62%) JEC produces more than the standalone
monopoly quantity for the least efficient firm in a given week, and for the specification in
levels this occurs 205 out of 328 times. The same observation can be made when output
levels are averaged for each of the potential collusive regimes (bottom panel).
[ *** Figure 1 appears about here *** ]
To further confirm our estimation results, own price elasticity of the demand is
calculated and presented in Table 4. As expected, the degree of monopolization is
positively related to the absolute value of price elasticity, i.e., the higher the degree of
monopolization the larger price elasticity of demand with correlation coefficient of 0.77.
On average, during collusive regimes price elasticity of demand is -5.11, which is almost
twice as big as the elasticity during non-collusive regimes of -2.75.
[ *** Table 4 appears about here *** ]
Lastly, we conducted several robustness checks of our specifications. First, we excluded
observations with 6 and 8 firms when the cartel indicator is zero and the Great Lakes
are open for navigation (see the note in Table 3). Estimation results do not change
qualitatively as can be seen from Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix A. Second, we estimated
the model using two alternative specifications for the cost function. Namely, in Table 16
pricing was found.
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we report estimation results where the marginal cost function is given by either









Columns 2 and 4 of Table 16 summarize the results. It turns out that including a linear
or non-linear term in quantity does not effect our estimates of the conduct parameter
substantially. Besides, the coefficients on the own quantity variable in the cost functions
are statistically not different from zero at any reasonable significance level. Unfortunately,
we do not have other instrumental variables to explore much richer specifications.
4.2.2 Absence of the Cartel Indicator
So far we use the cartel indicator, reported in the data, to tabulate regimes with a constant
level of collusion. In practice, however, econometricians or competition authorities do not
know whether or not firms collude. Thus, we must be able to define regimes relying only
on observed variation in the output levels and market shares, not the cartel indicator.
Therefore, without using the cartel indicator, we conduct two final empirical exercises: (i)
we create our own index describing potential regimes of JEC operations and estimate the
model with the new index, and (ii) we estimate the model at the monthly-level assuming
that θt is constant within a month.
Our New Indicator In order to create our own index of collusion, we inspect the data
for candidate collusive periods. Our criteria require a stable distribution of market shares
and reduction in output relative to the adjacent time intervals. To test the stability of
market shares, we use a t-test for difference in means, which accounts for serial correlation.
In particular, the test compares sub-intervals within a given interval.15 We find 9 such
intervals with 662 observations in total. Table 5 reports parameter estimates for each of
15We assumed AR(1) process for serial correlation and computed equivalent sample size using approxi-




with significance level 0.05.
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the collusive regimes with full estimation results listed in Table 17 in Appendix A.
[ *** Table 5 appears about here *** ]
For all regimes our estimates suggests at least some degree of collusion with the output
levels below static Cournot NE (in 8-firms period weeks 191-196 the output level was
very close to Cournot), as the percent reduction is almost always below one for both LE
and FE specifications. To check the validity of our method, we create a Cartel Index,
the average value of the reported cartel indicator during each period, expecting that the
percent reduction and the Cartel Index are negatively correlated. If the Cartel Index is
zero, for example, we must expect that the firms compete severely, yielding close to the
Cournot output. The correlation coefficient between the percent reduction and the Cartel
Index for the FE specification is -0.56, which indicates that the estimates are likely to be
able to detect the existence of the cartel.
Monthly-Level As a last step, we estimate monthly-level θt to examine whether our
methodology can detect the cartel for each month.16 Figure 2 plots the estimated monthly-
level θt. The black solid line shows the estimated value, whereas the gray solid lines
indicate the confidence interval. To examine the performance of our methodology, the
gray dashed line records the Cartel Index, which is an average value of the cartel indicator
within a month. Whenever our estimated θ’s go below one, the firms indeed failed to
collude, indicated by the Cartel Index falling below one. Therefore, this observation
validates our methodology.
[ *** Figure 2 appears about here *** ]
16Although our methodology allows us to estimate θt for weekly-level in principle, the JEC had a
small number of firms, between 5 and 8 firms depending on the time period. Estimating one parameter
(weekly-level θt), relying on only five to eight observations, might not yield statistically significant results.
Therefore, we estimate the model with monthly-level θt for stacking at least 20 observations for estimating
θt for each period.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a method to estimate the time-varying degree of industry
monopolization. The methodology does not impose any restrictions on the objective
function of colluding firms. Instead, we impose an assumption on how collusion is
implemented. We believe that our method has several advantages over the traditional
empirical literature on collusion. First of all, proportional reduction would be a natural way
to implement collusion with symmetric firms. Therefore, most of the earlier literature on
estimating conduct parameters can be viewed as a special case of our model. Asymmetricity
in the firms’ cost functions provides useful variation that can be utilized to identify the
degree of industry monopolization conditional on observing firm-level cost shifters. Second,
the parameter measuring the degree of industry monopolization is a continuous measure
relating observed levels of output to the hypothetical stage game Nash equilibrium. As
a result, it has a simple interpretation as the percentage of output reduction relative to
a well defined competitive equilibrium. Third, the fact that we do not require explicit
assumptions about the objective function of the cartel allows us to accommodate a
wide range of fairly complex models of collusion as long as the proportional reduction
assumption is satisfied. The latter fact can be empirically tested. Fourth, we show that
the variation in output levels across asymmetric firms allows time-varying estimates of
the degree of monopolization. This way one can address the critique by Corts (1999)
of the conjectural variation literature when the industry conduct is endogenous to the
changing demand and supply conditions. Finally, we believe that simplicity of the method
is appealing to industry practitioners because estimation can be done using standard
statistical software. Perhaps, the best application of our framework would be at the stage
of pre-screening procedures conducted by an antitrust authority when deciding about
taking the case for a thorough investigation or dismissing it.
Monte Carlo simulations illustrate finite-sample properties of the parameter estimates
and show that our method performs well even with medium sample sizes consisting of
100 to 300 data points. Thus, the parameter of interest can be estimated from relatively
short panels of firm-level observations. To further investigate the practicality of our
method, we use the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from the 19th century.
Our analysis using the available cartel indicator demonstrates that it strongly correlates
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with the estimated degree of collusion. Finally, we estimate the time-varying degree of
monopolization at a monthly level. Estimation results imply substantial variability in
the degree of collusion over time, with the output levels during price wars sometimes
exceeding quantities predicted by the Cournot equilibrium.
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Table 1: Traditional measure of industry conduct vs θ.




Table 2: Monte Carlo Simulation for N = 10, 30 and T = 10, 30
Regime 1: True parameter value = 1.000
T=10 T=30
θ̄ Std. Dev. ASE θ̄ Std. Dev. ASE
N = 10 1.000 0.005 0.004 1.000 0.002 0.002
N = 30 1.000 0.002 0.002 1.000 0.001 0.001
Regime 2: True parameter value = 1.200
T=10 T=30
θ̄ Std. Dev. ASE θ̄ Std. Dev. ASE
N = 10 1.200 0.012 0.010 1.200 0.006 0.006
N = 30 1.200 0.008 0.007 1.200 0.005 0.004
Regime 3: True parameter value = 1.400
T=10 T=30
θ̄ Std. Dev. ASE θ̄ Std. Dev. ASE
N = 10 1.400 0.019 0.016 1.400 0.010 0.010
N = 30 1.400 0.015 0.012 1.400 0.008 0.008
Note: θ̄ =
∑ns





s=1(θ̂s − θ̄). ASE is the average of
standard errors for each simulation.
Table 3: Summary of the monopolization parameter estimates using FE specifications
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv)
Table 8 Table 10 Table 12 Table 14
C = 0 C = 1 C=0 C=1 C=0 C=0 C=1 C=1
N L=0 L=1 L=0 L=1
5
1.31 1.51 0.71
− 0.40 − − 0.44 0.54
6 1.46 0.55 0.91 − 0.65 0.66
7 0.68 0.64 − 0.93 0.75 0.82
8 1.36 0.81 1.42 − 0.92 1.17
Note: N, C, and L denote the number of firms, the cartel indicator, and the Great Lake operation dummy, respec-
tively. Parameter estimates for the cases (N=6,C=0,L=1) and (N=8,C=0,L=1) are not statistically significant at
any reasonable significance levels and therefore are not reported.
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Table 4: Estimated parameters versus price elasticity across regimes
regime θ % of Cournot p−elasticity
N=5, C=1, L=0 2.29 0.44 -6.00
N=5, C=1, L=1 1.85 0.54 -6.34
N=6, C=0, L=0 1.10 0.91 -3.17
N=6, C=1, L=0 1.54 0.65 -4.31
N=6, C=1, L=1 1.51 0.66 -6.75
N=7, C=0, L=1 1.07 0.93 -4.52
N=7, C=1, L=0 1.33 0.75 -4.98
N=7, C=1, L=1 1.21 0.82 -5.23
N=8, C=0, L=0 0.70 1.42 -2.72
N=8, C=1, L=0 1.09 0.92 -3.28
N=8, C=1, L=1 0.85 1.17 -3.88
avg. 1.32 0.84 -4.65
Table 5: Estimation results for 9 selected periods satisfying PR assumption, 662 obs.
Regimes.
LE Specification FE Specification
Cartel
1st 2nd % Redu- 1st 2nd % Redu-
Index
Est. Est. ction Est. Est. ction
θ1 (N=6, 68-75) 1.548 1.531 0.65 1.534 1.522 0.66 0.71
(0.150) (0.144) (0.148) (0.145)
θ2 (N=6, 116-131) 1.447 1.418 0.71 1.423 1.394 0.72 1.00
(0.138) (0.131) (0.138) (0.132)
θ3 (N=6, 131-166) 1.650 1.616 0.62 1.630 1.600 0.63 0.97
(0.165) (0.156) (0.167) (0.160)
θ4 (N=7, 171-181, 324) 1.583 1.545 0.65 1.572 1.536 0.65 0.83
(0.168) (0.159) (0.171) (0.163)
θ5 (N=8, 184-189) 1.694 1.651 0.61 1.672 1.632 0.61 1.00
(0.185) (0.174) (0.187) (0.178)
θ6 (N=8, 191-196) 1.025 1.013 0.99 1.016 1.004 1.00 0.67
(0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056)
θ7 (N=8, 254-259) 1.200 1.184 0.84 1.186 1.170 0.85 0.83
(0.070) (0.067) (0.072) (0.069)
θ8 (N=8, 258-263) 1.109 1.074 0.93 1.091 1.051 0.95 0.83
(0.063) (0.058) (0.065) (0.061)
θ9 (N=8, 313-318) 1.212 1.231 0.81 1.192 1.220 0.82 0.67
(0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130)
Note: 1st and 2nd Est. report 1st and 2nd stage GMM esimates. % Reduction demonstrates the how much
firms reduce their output compared to Cournot outcomes. Cartel Index is calculated the average value of the cartel
indicator during the sample periods.
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Figure 1: Upper and low bounds on the total output by week (top panel) and by regime
(bottom panel) for estimates with firm FE’s (Table 13)
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Appendix A Estimation results
Table 6: Constant conduct parameter, mci = β0 + β1zit + νit (levels)
param. 1st stage %Cournot 2nd stage. %Cournot cont.-update %Cournot
α0 35847.846 36107.822 36100.903
(1846.092) (1851.162) (1851.018)
α1 -0.294 -0.302 -0.302
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6510.624 -6604.251 -6601.853
(893.286) (895.631) (895.564)
θ 0.677 1.48 0.763 1.31 0.761 1.31
(0.078) (0.069) (0.069)
β0 25472.798 24388.318 24333.122
(452.696) (461.001) (461.278)
β1 0.381 0.371 0.367
(0.160) (0.162) (0.162)
f − val 2794.6981 277.2121 268.8319
Table 7: Constant conduct parameter, mci = β0i + β1zit + νit (FE)
param. 1st stage %Cournot 2nd stage. %Cournot cont.-update %Cournot
α0 35856.839 36429.472 36413.757
(1846.005) (1857.807) (1857.448)
α1 -0.294 -0.311 -0.311
(0.052) (.052) (0.052)
α2 -6512.883 -6719.050 -6713.762
(893.302) (898.722) (898.556)
θ 0.666 1.50 0.749 1.34 0.722 1.39
(0.083) (0.074) (0.077)
β1 0.496 0.587 0.815
(0.216) (0.224) (0.238)
f − val 2735.5657 281.4734 271.1445
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Table 8: Regimes defined by the cartel indicator only, mci = β0 + β1zit + νit (levels)
param. 1st stage %Cournot 2nd stage. %Cournot cont.-update %Cournot
α0 35852.778 36396.104 36374.390
(1845.908) (1857.047) (1856.558)
α1 -0.294 -0.310 -0.310
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6511.863 -6707.138 -6699.672
(893.259) (898.378) (898.154)
θ0 (C=0) 0.637 1.57 0.663 1.51 0.659 1.52
(0.076) (0.070) (0.071)
θ1 (C=1) 1.398 0.72 1.409 0.71 1.424 0.70
(0.099) (0.096) (0.098)
β0 22669.676 21900.779 21762.925
(413.988) (420.671) (423.670)
β1 0.051 -0.016 -0.054
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147)
f − val 1870.773 238.657 227.135
Table 9: Regimes defined by the cartel indicator only, mci = β0i + β1zit + νit (FE)
param. 1st stage %Cournot 2nd stage. %Cournot cont.-update %Cournot
α0 35855.274 36602.543 36597.780
(1845.726) (1861.554) (1861.425)
α1 -0.294 -0.316 -0.316
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6512.490 -6780.817 -6779.655
(893.222) (900.470) (900.409)
θ0 (C=0) 0.625 1.60 0.670 1.49 0.659 1.52
(0.078) (0.069) (0.070)
θ1 (C=1) 1.371 0.73 1.372 0.73 1.363 0.73
(0.108) (0.101) (0.100)
β1 0.156 0.196 0.281
(0.193) (0.197) (0.202)
f − val 1844.615 270.430 264.910
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Table 10: Regimes defined by N and cartel indicator, mci = β0 + β1zit + νit (levels)
param. 1st stage %Cournot 2nd stage. %Cournot cont.-update %Cournot
α0 35834.452 35546.398 35545.746
(1845.755) (1840.689) (1840.681)
α1 -0.294 -0.285 -0.285
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6507.259 -6403.890 -6403.764
(893.140) (890.764) (890.759)
θ1 (N=5, C=1) 2.550 0.39 2.346 0.43 2.304 0.43
(0.322) (0.291) (0.283)
θ2 (N=6, C=0) 0.907 1.10 0.629 1.59 0.401 2.49
(0.086) (0.106) (0.135)
θ3 (N=6, C=1) 2.023 0.49 1.840 0.54 1.817 0.55
(0.208) (0.183) (0.180)
θ4 (N=7, C=0) 1.648 0.61 1.565 0.64 1.516 0.66
(0.148) (0.138) (0.131)
θ5 (N=7, C=1) 1.686 0.59 1.651 0.61 1.619 0.62
(0.145 (0.142) (0.137)
θ6 (N=8, C=0) 0.876 1.14 0.772 1.30 0.743 1.35
(0.048) (0.057) (0.061)
θ7 (N=8, C=1) 1.364 0.73 1.297 0.77 1.262 0.79
(0.092) (0.085) (0.080)
β0 20294.021 20954.043 21236.366
(412.154) (405.708) (411.161)
β1 -0.321 -0.297 -0.263
(0.152) (0.149) (0.151)
f − val 1014.420 163.301 164.366
Table 11: Regimes defined by N and cartel indicator, mci = β0i + β1zit + νit (FE)
param. 1st stage %Cournot 2nd stage. %Cournot cont.-update %Cournot
α0 35837.177 35657.267 35645.881
(1845.907) (1842.674) (1842.474)
α1 -0.294 -0.288 -0.288
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6507.943 -6443.455 -6439.437
(893.192) (891.680) (891.586)
θ1 (N=5, C=1) 2.471 0.40 2.488 0.40 2.511 0.40
(0.311) (0.319) (0.324)
θ2 (N=6, C=0) 0.817 1.22 0.687 1.46 0.589 1.70
(0.088) (0.096) (0.105)
θ3 (N=6, C=1) 1.904 0.53 1.802 0.55 1.778 0.56
(0.201) (0.187) (0.184)
θ4 (N=7, C=0) 1.546 0.65 1.467 0.68 1.431 0.70
(0.144) (0.134) (0.130)
θ5 (N=7, C=1) 1.595 0.63 1.572 0.64 1.551 0.64
(0.139) (0.138) (0.134)
θ6 (N=8, C=0) 0.799 1.25 0.738 1.36 0.723 1.38
(0.057) (0.062) (0.063)
θ7 (N=8, C=1) 1.274 0.78 1.240 0.81 1.221 0.82
(0.089) (0.086) (0.084)
β1 0.011 -0.003 0.006
(0.189) (0.186) (0.186)
f − val 1003.630 203.199 216.512
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Table 12: Regimes defined by N , cartel indicator and state of demand, mci = β0 + β1zit + νit
(levels)
param. 1st stage % 2nd stage. % cont.-update %
α0 35839.113 35739.791 35741.825
(1845.186) (1843.389) (1843.426)
α1 -0.294 -0.291 -0.291
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6508.430 -6472.906 -6473.643
(893.011) (892.168) (892.186)
θ1 (N=5, C=1, L=0) 2.257 0.44 2.348 0.43 2.354 0.42
(0.279) (0.298) (0.299)
θ2 (N=5, C=1, L=1) 1.859 0.54 1.923 0.52 1.924 0.52
(0.185) (0.198) (0.198)
θ3 (N=6, C=0, L=0) 1.114 0.90 1.155 0.87 1.155 0.87
(0.114) (0.117) (0.117)
θ4 (N=6, C=0, L=1) 0.137 7.30 0.165 6.06 0.166 6.02
(0.152) (0.149) (0.149)
θ5 (N=6, C=1, L=0) 1.574 0.64 1.616 0.62 1.617 0.62
(0.132) (0.140) (0.140)
θ6 (N=6, C=1, L=1) 1.535 0.65 1.604 0.62 1.606 0.62
(0.136) (0.147) (0.147)
θ7 (N=7, C=0, L=1) 1.091 0.92 1.143 0.87 1.145 0.87
(0.077) (0.082) (0.082)
θ8 (N=7, C=1, L=0) 1.356 0.74 1.393 0.72 1.394 0.72
(0.088) (0.094) (0.094)
θ9 (N=7, C=1, L=1) 1.231 0.81 1.284 0.78 1.286 0.78
(0.100) (0.106) (0.106)
θ10 (N=8, C=0, L=0) 0.736 1.36 0.752 1.33 0.752 1.33
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056)
θ11 (N=8, C=0, L=1) 0.211 4.74 0.240 4.17 0.242 4.13
(0.141) (0.138) (0.137)
θ12 (N=8, C=1, L=0) 1.125 0.89 1.154 0.87 1.155 0.87
(0.062) (0.065) (0.065)
θ13 (N=8, C=1, L=1) 0.869 1.15 0.904 1.11 0.905 1.10
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056)
β0 23810.582 23529.588 23519.281
(409.084) (410.955) (411.084)
β1 -0.294 -0.338 -0.339
(0.130) (0.132) (0.132)
f − val 8.251 3.376 3.311
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Table 13: Regimes defined by N , cartel indicator and state of demand, mci = βi0 + β1zit + νit
(FE)
param. 1st stage % 2nd stage. % cont.-update %
α0 35839.791 35831.157 35831.293
(1845.995) (1845.835) (1845.838)
α1 -0.294 -0.294 -0.294
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
α2 -6508.600 -6505.512 -6505.561
(893.227) (893.152) (893.153)
θ1 (N=5, C=1, L=0) 2.212 0.45 2.287 0.44 2.294 0.44
(0.274) (0.288) (0.290)
θ2 (N=5, C=1, L=1) 1.800 0.56 1.847 0.54 1.849 0.54
(0.184) (0.192) (0.193)
θ3 (N=6, C=0, L=0) 1.056 0.95 1.095 0.91 1.094 0.91
(0.112) (0.114) (0.114)
θ4 (N=6, C=0, L=1) 0.089 11.24 0.118 8.47 0.119 8.40
(0.155) (0.151) (0.150)
θ5 (N=6, C=1, L=0) 1.508 0.66 1.540 0.65 1.541 0.65
(0.135) (0.140) (0.140)
θ6 (N=6, C=1, L=1) 1.456 0.69 1.509 0.66 1.511 0.66
(0.140) (0.147) (0.147)
θ7 (N=7, C=0, L=1) 1.033 0.97 1.074 0.93 1.075 0.93
(0.082) (0.085) (0.085)
θ8 (N=7, C=1, L=0) 1.306 0.77 1.332 0.75 1.333 0.75
(0.090) (0.094) (0.094)
θ9 (N=7, C=1, L=1) 1.173 0.85 1.213 0.82 1.215 0.82
(0.103) (0.107) (0.107)
θ10 (N=8, C=0, L=0) 0.690 1.45 0.704 1.42 0.705 1.42
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
θ11 (N=8, C=0, L=1) 0.166 6.02 0.195 5.13 0.197 5.08
(0.143) (0.139) (0.139)
θ12 (N=8, C=1, L=0) 1.068 0.94 1.090 0.92 1.091 0.92
(0.067) (0.069) (0.069)
θ13 (N=8, C=1, L=1) 0.823 1.22 0.852 1.17 0.853 1.17
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
c1 -0.106 -0.143 -0.143
(0.163) (0.164) (0.164)
f − val 6.659 2.842 2.798
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Table 14: Reduced sample, mci = β0 + β1zit + νit
param. 1st stage % 2nd stage. % cont.-update %
α0 33652.344 33480.469 33485.943
(2085.344) (2084.071) (2084.114)
α1 -0.220 -0.215 -0.215
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
α2 -3198.509 -3125.633 -3128.026
(1050.390) (1048.918) (1048.963)
θ1 (N=5, C=1, L=0) 2.678 0.37 2.846 0.35 2.853 0.35
(0.525) (0.585) (0.586)
θ2 (N=5, C=1, L=1) 2.122 0.47 2.265 0.44 2.265 0.44
(0.349) (0.398) (0.397)
θ3 (N=6, C=0, L=0) 1.139 0.88 1.221 0.82 1.221 0.82
(0.160) (0.174) (0.174)
θ4 (N=6, C=1, L=0) 1.747 0.57 1.842 0.54 1.843 0.54
(0.243) (0.274) (0.274)
θ5 (N=6, C=1, L=1) 1.661 0.60 1.801 0.56 1.803 0.55
(0.235) (0.274) (0.274)
θ6 (N=7, C=0, L=1) 1.080 0.93 1.191 0.84 1.193 0.84
(0.110) (0.127) (0.127)
θ7 (N=7, C=1, L=0) 1.463 0.68 1.542 0.65 1.543 0.65
(0.159) (0.184) (0.184)
θ8 (N=7, C=1, L=1) 1.265 0.79 1.378 0.73 1.379 0.73
(0.151) (0.176) (0.176)
θ9 (N=8, C=0, L=0) 0.639 1.56 0.676 1.48 0.677 1.48
(0.106) (0.100) (0.100)
θ10 (N=8, C=1, L=0) 1.145 0.87 1.212 0.83 1.213 0.82
(0.093) (0.108) (0.108)
θ11 (N=8, C=1, L=1) 0.804 1.24 0.874 1.14 0.875 1.14
(0.091) (0.087) (0.086)
β0 24175.641 23713.288 23705.834
(455.280) (461.587) (461.803)
β1 -0.249 -0.291 -0.291
(0.139) (0.142) (0.142)
f − val 9.710 3.550 3.439
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Table 15: Reduced sample, mci = βi0 + β1zit + νit
param. 1st stage % 2nd stage. % cont.-update %
α0 33653.329 33664.271 33663.994
(2087.356) (2087.450) (2087.447)
α1 -0.220 -0.220 -0.220
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
α2 -3198.860 -3203.499 -3203.382
(1051.114) (1051.213) (1051.210)
θ1 (N=5, C=1, L=0) 2.619 0.38 2.734 0.37 2.744 0.36
(0.517) (0.549) (0.551)
θ2 (N=5, C=1, L=1) 2.044 0.49 2.129 0.47 2.130 0.47
(0.345) (0.368) (0.368)
θ3 (N=6, C=0, L=0) 1.061 0.94 1.134 0.88 1.131 0.88
(0.155) (0.163) (0.163)
θ4 (N=6, C=1, L=0) 1.658 0.60 1.716 0.58 1.717 0.58
(0.241) (0.255) (0.256)
θ5 (N=6, C=1, L=1) 1.559 0.64 1.645 0.61 1.647 0.61
(0.236) (0.255) (0.256)
θ6 (N=7, C=0, L=1) 0.995 1.01 1.071 0.93 1.072 0.93
(0.119) (0.126) (0.127)
θ7 (N=7, C=1, L=0) 1.391 0.72 1.435 0.70 1.436 0.70
(0.158) (0.169) (0.169)
θ8 (N=7, C=1, L=1) 1.180 0.85 1.253 0.80 1.255 0.80
(0.155) (0.166) (0.167)
θ9 (N=8, C=0, L=0) 0.573 1.75 0.602 1.66 0.602 1.66
(0.117) (0.111) (0.111)
θ10 (N=8, C=1, L=0) 1.062 0.94 1.103 0.91 1.104 0.91
(0.099) (0.105) (0.105)
θ11 (N=8, C=1, L=1) 0.735 1.36 0.786 1.27 0.787 1.27
(0.100) (0.095) (0.095)
β1 -0.056 -0.074 -0.075
(0.175) (0.177) (0.177)
f − val 6.764 2.630 2.564
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Table 16: Alternative specifications for marginal cost function, GMM 2nd stage
param.
mcit = βi0 + β1zit + β2qit mcit = βi0 + β1zit + (β2 + 1)q
β2
it







θ1 (N=5, C=1, L=0) 2.609 0.38 2.117 0.47
(1.430) (1.118)
θ2 (N=5, C=1, L=1) 2.085 0.48 1.686 0.59
(1.063) (0.874)
θ3 (N=6, C=0, L=0) 1.193 0.84 0.981 1.02
(0.470) (0.427)
θ4 (N=6, C=0, L=1) 0.101 9.90 0.074 13.51
(0.175) (0.148)
θ5 (N=6, C=1, L=0) 1.689 0.59 1.411 0.71
(0.689) (0.620)
θ6 (N=6, C=1, L=1) 1.649 0.61 1.372 0.73
(0.642) (0.601)
θ7 (N=7, C=0, L=1) 1.152 0.87 0.975 1.03
(0.362) (0.366)
θ8 (N=7, C=1, L=0) 1.443 0.69 1.228 0.81
(0.501) (0.478)
θ9 (N=7, C=1, L=1) 1.307 0.77 1.107 0.90
(0.429) (0.427)
θ10 (N=8, C=0, L=0) 0.741 1.35 0.632 1.58
(0.194) (0.204)
θ11 (N=8, C=0, L=1) 0.187 5.35 0.148 6.76
(0.153) (0.138)
θ12 (N=8, C=1, L=0) 1.158 0.86 1.002 1.00
(0.322) (0.333)






f − val 3.735 2.339
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Figure 3: Upper and low bounds on the total output by week (top panel) and by regime
(bottom panel) for estimates in levels (Table 12)
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Table 17: Estimation results for 9 selected periods satisfying PR assumption, 662 obs.
param.
levels firm fixed-effects
1st 2nd % 1st 2nd %
α0 35329.948 35522.669 35326.973 35427.255
(2123.370) (2130.429) (2125.596) (2129.231)
α1 -0.281 -0.286 -0.281 -0.284
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
α2 -6356.179 -6427.317 -6355.350 -6392.351
(1018.042) (1020.952) (1018.649) (1020.149)
θ1 (N=6, 68-75) 1.548 1.531 0.65 1.534 1.522 0.66
(0.150) (0.144) (0.148) (0.145)
θ2 (N=6, 116-131) 1.447 1.418 0.71 1.423 1.394 0.72
(0.138) (0.131) (0.138) (0.132)
θ3 (N=6, 131-166) 1.650 1.616 0.62 1.630 1.600 0.63
(0.165) (0.156) (0.167) (0.160)
θ4 (N=7, 171-181, 324) 1.583 1.545 0.65 1.572 1.536 0.65
(0.168) (0.159) (0.171) (0.163)
θ5 (N=8, 184-189) 1.694 1.651 0.61 1.672 1.632 0.61
(0.185) (0.174) (0.187) (0.178)
θ6 (N=8, 191-196) 1.025 1.013 0.99 1.016 1.004 1.00
(0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056)
θ7 (N=8, 254-259) 1.200 1.184 0.84 1.186 1.170 0.85
(0.070) (0.067) (0.072) (0.069)
θ8 (N=8, 258-263) 1.109 1.074 0.93 1.091 1.051 0.95
(0.063) (0.058) (0.065) (0.061)
θ9 (N=8, 313-318) 1.212 1.231 0.81 1.192 1.220 0.82
(0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130)
β0 22220.813 22305.381 -
(319.017) (317.656)
β1 -0.229 -0.214 -0.170 -0.150
(0.104) (0.104) (0.128) (0.127)
f − val 37.892 3.158 46.627 4.106
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Appendix B Profitability of PR collusive technology
Lemma 1 Proportional reduction collusive technology is profitable for all firms in the neigh-
borhood of Cournot equilibrium.
Proof A Cournot competitor first-order conditions are given by
P ′(Qt)qit + P (Qt)− C ′i(qit) = 0.
Consider a cartel, which sets overall industry output to Q̄t = Q
Cournot
t and assigns market
shares such that Q̄tsit = q
Cournot
it ,∀i = 1, . . . , n, where sit is market share of firm i in period
t. Then, profit of a cartel member is given by πm(sit, Q̄t) = P (Q̄t)Q̄tsit − Ci(Q̄tsit) and, by
construction, is identical to the non-cooperative Cournot outcome.
Consider a derivative of this profit function with respect to Q̄t,
∂πm(sit, Q̄t)
∂Q̄t
= P ′(Q̄t)Q̄tsit + P (Q̄t)sit − C ′i(Q̄tsit)sit
= C ′i(qit)− P (Q̄t) + P (Q̄t)sit − C ′i(Q̄tsit)sit
= (1− sit)
(
C ′i(qit)− P (Q̄t)
)
< 0,
where the second equality is obtained by replacing P ′(Q̄t)Q̄tsit with C
′
i(qit)− P (Q̄t) and the
inequality follows from the fact that C ′i(qit)− P (Q̄t) = P ′(Qt)qit < 0.
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Appendix C MC simulations
The data generating process for our Monte-Carlo simulations is as follows. We assume the
following inverse demand and cost functions,
Pt = α0 + α1Qt + α2Yt + ν
d
t ,
mci(qit, zit) = β0 + β1zit + ν
s
it.
Table 18 summarizes parameter values and the distribution of the variables. We simulated
data 10,000 times for each of the following combinations of (N, T ): (10, 10), (10, 20), (10, 30),
(20, 10), (20, 20), (20, 30), (30, 10), (30, 20), and (30, 30). Each time parameters were estimated
using 2-step optimal GMM.
Table 18: Summary of parameter values for data-generating process in MC-simulations










θ {1.0, 1.2, 1.4}
We present summary statistic for a typical data set generated for N = 30, T = 30 in
Table 19.
Table 19: Summary statistics for simulated data, N=30, T=30.
variable mean p50 min max sd
qit 13.397 13.306 7.688 21.319 2.369
Qt 401.918 396.420 331.500 488.790 51.116
Pt 100.003 106.385 26.574 166.800 49.782
Y 1.944 1.789 -16.740 26.532 9.000
zit 1.102 1.107 -4.765 7.932 1.969
z−it 31.967 29.714 12.246 58.177 10.174
regime 1 0.267 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.442
regime 2 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499
regime 3 0.267 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.442
Yt 1.944 1.789 -16.740 26.532 9.000
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Table 20: Summary statistic for MC simulations.
var N,T
coefficient standard error
mean p50 sd min max mean p50 sd min max
α0
10,10 500.049 499.810 13.858 358.310 668.440 11.501 9.266 11.525 0.453 507.380
20,10 499.957 500.010 12.857 381.650 599.580 11.000 9.175 7.517 0.611 85.738
30,10 500.167 500.080 12.979 356.070 591.330 10.973 9.143 7.527 0.654 73.862
10,20 499.926 499.950 9.286 454.870 556.630 8.809 8.766 3.748 1.123 83.080
20,20 500.108 499.965 9.426 453.780 551.090 8.778 8.850 3.563 1.163 39.685
30,20 500.098 500.050 9.148 453.710 553.730 8.714 8.806 3.528 1.150 26.701
10,30 499.959 499.930 7.864 453.770 606.620 7.677 7.780 6.317 1.373 591.800
20,30 499.968 499.950 7.716 458.510 537.970 7.536 7.702 2.344 1.395 16.097
30,30 500.026 499.960 7.621 464.530 536.820 7.441 7.644 2.307 1.533 17.287
α1
10,10 -1.000 -1.000 0.037 -1.407 -0.625 0.031 0.025 0.030 0.001 1.318
20,10 -1.000 -1.000 0.033 -1.253 -0.688 0.028 0.023 0.019 0.002 0.220
30,10 -1.000 -1.000 0.032 -1.212 -0.615 0.027 0.023 0.019 0.002 0.181
10,20 -1.000 -1.000 0.025 -1.155 -0.879 0.023 0.023 0.010 0.003 0.217
20,20 -1.000 -1.000 0.024 -1.125 -0.877 0.022 0.022 0.009 0.003 0.109
30,20 -1.000 -1.000 0.023 -1.132 -0.884 0.022 0.022 0.009 0.003 0.066
10,30 -1.000 -1.000 0.021 -1.272 -0.877 0.020 0.021 0.016 0.004 1.512
20,30 -1.000 -1.000 0.020 -1.097 -0.898 0.019 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.040
30,30 -1.000 -1.000 0.019 -1.094 -0.909 0.019 0.019 0.006 0.004 0.043
α2
10,10 1.001 1.001 0.087 -0.359 2.032 0.071 0.049 0.083 0.004 2.580
20,10 1.000 0.999 0.078 0.054 1.929 0.067 0.048 0.057 0.005 0.642
30,10 1.001 1.001 0.079 0.034 1.985 0.067 0.049 0.057 0.004 0.630
10,20 1.000 1.000 0.042 0.650 1.316 0.041 0.034 0.023 0.006 0.262
20,20 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.699 1.314 0.041 0.035 0.023 0.007 0.278
30,20 1.000 0.999 0.041 0.716 1.303 0.040 0.035 0.022 0.008 0.291
10,30 1.000 1.000 0.031 0.783 1.201 0.031 0.028 0.015 0.008 0.236
20,30 1.000 1.000 0.031 0.774 1.204 0.031 0.028 0.014 0.007 0.139
30,30 1.000 1.000 0.031 0.782 1.306 0.031 0.028 0.014 0.008 0.154
θ1
10,10 1.000 1.000 0.005 0.956 1.166 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.700
20,10 1.000 1.000 0.003 0.975 1.023 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.017
30,10 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.990 1.023 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.011
10,20 1.000 1.000 0.003 0.988 1.016 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.016
20,20 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.993 1.008 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.006
30,20 1.000 1.000 0.001 0.993 1.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003
10,30 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.983 1.014 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.074
20,30 1.000 1.000 0.001 0.994 1.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003
30,30 1.000 1.000 0.001 0.996 1.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
θ2
10,10 1.200 1.200 0.012 1.097 1.447 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.002 1.023
20,10 1.200 1.200 0.009 1.155 1.314 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.071
30,10 1.200 1.200 0.008 1.159 1.349 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.072
10,20 1.200 1.200 0.008 1.161 1.242 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.053
20,20 1.200 1.200 0.006 1.172 1.234 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.024
30,20 1.200 1.200 0.005 1.172 1.231 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.015
10,30 1.200 1.200 0.006 1.140 1.243 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.259
20,30 1.200 1.200 0.005 1.178 1.227 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.011
30,30 1.200 1.200 0.005 1.178 1.225 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.011
θ3
10,10 1.401 1.400 0.019 1.235 1.723 0.016 0.013 0.020 0.002 1.325
20,10 1.400 1.400 0.015 1.320 1.605 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.129
30,10 1.400 1.400 0.015 1.324 1.675 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.134
10,20 1.400 1.400 0.012 1.334 1.468 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.087
20,20 1.400 1.400 0.011 1.349 1.462 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.042
30,20 1.400 1.400 0.010 1.349 1.457 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.027
10,30 1.400 1.400 0.010 1.300 1.471 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.436
20,30 1.400 1.400 0.009 1.361 1.449 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.019
30,30 1.400 1.400 0.008 1.360 1.446 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.020
β0
10,10 9.941 9.990 2.006 -62.295 24.268 1.496 1.259 3.196 0.423 211.650
20,10 10.024 10.015 1.066 2.599 22.927 0.973 0.889 0.385 0.371 7.414
30,10 10.009 10.010 0.842 4.176 15.053 0.789 0.726 0.286 0.309 4.553
10,20 9.994 9.996 0.843 5.929 15.393 0.810 0.781 0.182 0.396 2.352
20,20 9.996 10.002 0.581 7.405 12.843 0.567 0.550 0.116 0.288 1.467
30,20 10.006 10.005 0.477 7.793 12.339 0.463 0.450 0.092 0.254 1.163
10,30 10.005 10.007 0.646 7.419 12.924 0.624 0.610 0.139 0.361 9.947
20,30 10.007 10.007 0.451 8.027 11.789 0.440 0.433 0.069 0.266 0.790
30,30 10.003 10.004 0.365 8.433 11.529 0.359 0.354 0.054 0.219 0.691
β1
10,10 1.000 1.000 0.029 0.685 1.472 0.025 0.020 0.023 0.008 0.970
20,10 1.000 1.000 0.027 0.766 1.194 0.024 0.019 0.014 0.006 0.184
30,10 1.000 1.000 0.027 0.704 1.176 0.023 0.019 0.015 0.005 0.152
10,20 1.000 1.000 0.019 0.912 1.111 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.006 0.168
20,20 1.000 1.000 0.019 0.902 1.095 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.081
30,20 1.000 1.000 0.019 0.903 1.107 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.005 0.054
10,30 1.000 1.000 0.016 0.908 1.216 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.006 1.215
20,30 1.000 1.000 0.016 0.915 1.079 0.015 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.033
30,30 1.000 1.000 0.016 0.928 1.080 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.005 0.035
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